From 61b32ec647d2e0acdb5669c4ae394798152a6e8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Senescu <44480372+bensenescu@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2026 14:37:46 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fix: extend OAuth state cookie lifetime to match the
 10-minute state TTL (#544)

---
 src/lib/auth-config.ts                 | 10 ++++++++++
 src/lib/auth.ts                        | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
 src/server/mcp/api-key-auth.ts         |  1 +
 src/server/workflows/rankCheckPaths.ts |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/lib/auth-config.ts b/src/lib/auth-config.ts
index f818126..989ff9d 100644
--- a/src/lib/auth-config.ts
+++ b/src/lib/auth-config.ts
@@ -15,6 +15,16 @@ export function createBaseAuthConfig() {
         // /api/auth endpoint. Header lookup is case-insensitive.
         ipAddressHeaders: ["cf-connecting-ip"],
       },
+      // Better Auth writes the OAuth state verification row with a 10-minute
+      // expiry but sets the matching signed cookie with maxAge 300, and
+      // parseGenericState checks the cookie before the row's expiresAt — so the
+      // intended 10-minute window is unreachable. The GSC and GA4 providers
+      // below force `select_account consent`, a two-screen Google flow, so a
+      // user who takes more than 5 minutes returns with a live verification row
+      // and a dead cookie and fails with "State mismatch: State not persisted
+      // correctly". The row's expiresAt still enforces the real 10-minute
+      // window and the state stays single-use, so this is not a weakening.
+      cookies: { state: { attributes: { maxAge: 600 } } },
     },
     account: {
       // Encrypt OAuth access/refresh tokens at rest in D1. Also covers the
diff --git a/src/lib/auth.ts b/src/lib/auth.ts
index e10b372..565540b 100644
--- a/src/lib/auth.ts
+++ b/src/lib/auth.ts
@@ -68,14 +68,27 @@ function createAuth() {
   const auth = betterAuth({
     baseURL: baseUrl,
     secret: getHostedSecret(),
-    // The api-key plugin logs every verification failure at error level — a
-    // stale key or a throttled caller included. The /mcp handler already logs
-    // the response it returns at the right level (debug for 401, warn for 429),
-    // so drop the duplicate.
     logger: {
-      log: (level, message, ...args) => {
+      log: (level, message, ...args: unknown[]) => {
+        // The api-key plugin logs every verification failure at error level — a
+        // stale key or a throttled caller included. The /mcp handler already logs
+        // the response it returns at the right level (debug for 401, warn for 429),
+        // so drop the duplicate.
         if (message.startsWith("Failed to validate API key")) return;
-        console[level](`[better-auth] ${message}`, ...args);
+        // "Failed to parse state" is user/browser behavior: a replayed OAuth
+        // callback URL (back button, restored tab), or a consent screen left
+        // open past the state's lifetime. The request already redirects the
+        // user to an error page; nothing here is on-call actionable.
+        const effectiveLevel =
+          level === "error" && message === "Failed to parse state"
+            ? "warn"
+            : level;
+        // Also drops Better Auth's ISO-timestamp prefix, which makes every log
+        // line fingerprint as its own error group in observability.
+        console[effectiveLevel === "debug" ? "log" : effectiveLevel](
+          `[better-auth] ${message}`,
+          ...args,
+        );
       },
     },
     ...baseAuthConfig,
diff --git a/src/server/mcp/api-key-auth.ts b/src/server/mcp/api-key-auth.ts
index 0de319d..31cd333 100644
--- a/src/server/mcp/api-key-auth.ts
+++ b/src/server/mcp/api-key-auth.ts
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ export async function handleMcpApiKeyRequest(
     // clients (see lib/auth-api-key.ts). Cloudflare's counter is per-colo
     // best-effort, which is all this needs to be: credits bound spend, this
     // bounds runaway request volume.
+    // oxlint-disable-next-line typescript/no-unsafe-type-assertion -- the binding is declared in alchemy.run.ts; env stays unknown through the MCP handler chain
     const rateLimit = (env as { MCP_RATE_LIMIT?: RateLimit }).MCP_RATE_LIMIT;
     if (rateLimit) {
       const { success } = await rateLimit.limit({ key: userId });
diff --git a/src/server/workflows/rankCheckPaths.ts b/src/server/workflows/rankCheckPaths.ts
index 2c211cd..0503876 100644
--- a/src/server/workflows/rankCheckPaths.ts
+++ b/src/server/workflows/rankCheckPaths.ts
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ async function checkBatchLive(
       results.push(outcome.value);
       return;
     }
-    const reason = outcome.reason;
+    const reason: unknown = outcome.reason;
     const code = reason instanceof AppError ? reason.code : "UNKNOWN";
     const message = reason instanceof Error ? reason.message : String(reason);
     // DataForSEO erring on its own side is a provider flake, not our bug: the